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ABSTRACT
The contribution of a patrol squadron to the total ASW readiness
is dependent in part upon the effectiveness with which allocated or
assigned personnel are utilized. In the hope of increasing that effec-
tiveness , organizationally induced problems encountered in the alloca-
tion and utilization of flight crew personnel were investigated. A
possible solution is offered which involves minor organizational
changes, establishment of a flight crew rate, and a functional appli-
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Patrol Squadrons with a primary mission to conduct all-weather
anti-submarine operations, assigned to Patrol Air Wings of the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets, contribute a large portion of the overall anti-
submarine warfare effort of the Navy. These squadrons consist of
approximately 50 officers, 270 enlisted personnel, 12 patrol aircraft,
and various organizational support equipment.
In addition to the mission requirement, a patrol squadron is
required to perform the necessary administrative and support functions.
The squadron also performs the majority of the organizational mainten-
ance on its equipment and aircraft, short of overhaul. The contribu-
tion of the individual patrol squadron to the overall ASW ability of
the Navy depends directly on the effectiveness with which the squadron
utilizes its resources to maintain its individual mission ability, or
mission readiness.
The individual resource categories available to a squadron are
many in number but basically all are included in the three categories
of men, money, and materials. The fundamental problem in maintaining a
high mission ability, or mission readiness, is the decision concerning
the allocation, within the established organization, of the available
resources to obtain their maximum utilization.
The organization of any individual patrol squadron must be de-
signed and established to promote effective allocation and utilization
of all the assigned resources by the proper separation and identification

of the major decision areas contributing to the squadron mission. Or-
ganizational structures which do not recognize and separate these deci-
sion areas only increase unnecessarily, by organizationally induced
problems, the number of factors requiring consideration in allocation
decisions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the organizationally in-
duced problems encountered in the allocation and utilization of only
one of the squadron resources, flight crew personnel, and offer a pos-




The Naval Warfare publication, "Missions and Characteristics of
U. S. Naval Ships and Aircraft," defines the mission of the patrol
squadron as follows:
To conduct all weather antisubmarine operations.
The following tasks are included within the scope of the above
2defined mission:
•»
a. To detect, track and destroy enemy submarines, singly or in
conjunction with other air, surface or subsurface force.
b. To conduct antisubmarine escort of convoys and fleet units.
c. To patrol sea and coastal areas to protect against enemy sub-
marine penetrations and submarine launched attack.
d. Within the capabilities of ASW configured aircraft and ASW
trained crews, conduct the following:
1) Aerial mining.
2) Reconnaissance.
3) Assistance in air/sea rescue operations.
4) Destruction of enemy shipping.
The normal operational chain of command of a patrol squadron
assigned to the Pacific Fleet is shown in figure 1. A similar chain
*-NWIP 11-20, Missions and Characteristics of U. S. Naval Ships and
Aircraft (U) , Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
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of command exists in the Atlantic Fleet. Squadrons are grouped into
Wings under an Air Wing Commander, who assigns operational commitments
to the squadrons and serves to coordinate the efforts of the squadrons
within the Wing.
The total military output of the ASW forces is a function of the
combined outputs of the individual units assigned. The contribution of
the individual squadron's mission ability, or readiness, to the total
ASW readiness is shown in figure 2. This contribution is dependent
upon the effectiveness with which these individual units utilize the
resources assigned to them. These resources include, but are not
limited to, operating funds, personnel, primary mission equipment, and
facilities. Effectiveness of resource utilization must be judged in
terms of a single agreed criterion, or value judgment. Presently, the
effectiveness of a squadron is measured indirectly by assigning a cal-
culated value to its military output in terms of a "Readiness Index."
The Readiness Index is a quantitative judgment of the ability of
the squadron to perform its mission. This Index is expressed as a per-
centage and is determined by adding points for (a) Crew Training, (b)
Aircraft Availability, and (c) Personnel. The final formulae for deter
mining the point values for each of the above three areas are as fol-
lows:
Total accumulated points
Crew Training Points = for squadron crews X .65
Crews allowed
Total number of aircraft
Aircraft Availability Points = operationally ready at 0800 X .20










































Personnel Points = Percent of allowed aviation x a5
ratings on board
3
These three formulae are basic to all patrol squadrons.
Personnel points achieved are directly dependent on the percent of
aviation ratings on board and are in no way controlled by the squadron.
The percent of aviation ratings on board is, within small variations,
determined by the Fleet Manning Level, established by higher authority,
and can be considered a constant factor for all squadrons.
Assuming adequate material support, both aircraft availability and
crew training points are a direct function of the time, or manhours
allocated to each of these two areas. The squadron has direct control
over the allocation of the available manhours of the assigned personnel
and therefore can directly affect the point values achieved for aircraft
availability and flight crew training.
Accepting the readiness index as an adequate indirect measurement
of mission ability and a direct measurement of squadron effectiveness
immediately establishes two major decision areas. These areas are air-
craft availability, which is a direct result of aircraft maintenance
performed, and flight crew training, both of which directly contribute
to the squadron effectiveness.
Although the available manhours are directly controlled by the
squadron, efficient utilization of these manhours can be adversely
affected by the very squadron organization which has been established
3Commander Fleet Air Wings, Pacific Fleet Instruction 03500.3,
Readiness Reporting by Pacific Fleet Patrol Squadrons (U) , 31 December
1964.

to accomplish the assigned mission.
Recognition of the need to effectively utilize the limited manhour
resource has been clearly demonstrated by the Implementation of the
Standard Navy Maintenance and Material Management System (3M System)
which provides for a uniform means of planned maintenance throughout
the operating forces of the Navy, including patrol squadrons. In com-
parison, proportionate effort must be expended to improve the basic
squadron organization to provide for more effective utilization of all
personnel, but primarily flight crew personnel.

CHAPTER III
PRESENT SQUADRON ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE
A standard organization has long been recognized as a valuable man-
agement tool for more effective use of personnel. The Navy has made
extensive use of a standard organization among units with identical mis-
sion assignments. The basic patrol squadron organization is shown in
figure 3, and is applicable to the squadrons considered by this paper.
The typical patrol squadron is composed of three basic departments
,
-a
the Administrative, Operations, and Maintenance Departments. Each of
these departments is administered by a department head who is subordi-
nate to an Executive Officer and a Commanding Officer. These depart-
ment heads are responsible for the operation and overall performance of
their department and the basic duties enumerated by U. S. Navy Regula-
1
tions.
The Administrative Department is normally organized as shown in
2
figure 4 under the supervision of the Administrative Officer. This
department is responsible for the administration of the squadron corre-
spondence, officer and enlisted personnel matters, legal matters, and
any other matters of an administrative nature. The Administrative Offi-
cer is assisted in the performance of his duties by junior officers
assigned to the positions indicated in figure 4. Assignment of enlisted
U. S. Navy Regulations, Department of the Navy, Office of the Sec-
retary of the Navy, 9 August 1948, Chapter 9, p. 111.
2NWTP 41-1 9 ASW Patrol Aircraft (U), Department of the Navy, Office











































































personnel to the various functions within the department completes the
organization and provides the administrative services required by the
squadron.
The Operations Department is normally organized as shown in
3figure 5 under the supervision of the Operations Officer. He is re-
sponsible for the operational readiness of the squadron personnel and
aircraft.
The personnel responsibilities include, but are not limited to,
flight and ground training for pilots and flight crews, training of
other personnel in all areas pertaining to the proper operation of air-
craft, maintenance of an up-to-date tactical organization bill assigning
flight crew personnel, and control of flight crew operational activi-
ties.
The aircraft readiness responsibilities of the Operations Officer
include the control of squadron flight operations, coordination with
the Maintenance Officer to Insure the available aircraft are operation-
ally ready for the assigned mission, and any other matters of an opera-
tional nature pertaining to the squadron aircraft.
The Operations Officer is assisted in the performance of his
duties by the officers assigned to the various positions shown in fig-
ure 5. Enlisted personnel are also assigned to the various branches
within the department to complete the organization.
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figure 6, which is the organization directed by the current Bureau of
4
Weapons Ins true tiost. The Maintenance Department is under the super-
vision and direction of the Maintenance Officer who is responsible for
the support of the squadron operations by the upkeep of assigned air-
craft and associated support equipment to the level required. The pri-
mary functions of the Maintenance Department include, but are not
limited to, maintenance, inspection and servicing of assigned aircraft,
maintenance of records and technical publications, and training of as-
signed personnel.
-a
The Maintenance Officer is assisted in the performance of his
duties by the officers assigned to the various positions shown in fig-
ure 6. Enlisted personnel are assigned within the department to the
various divisions and branches as required to accomplish the maintenance
functions required.
The basic tactical unit of a patrol squadron is an aircraft and
the operational flight crew required to perform the mission assigned.
The flight crews are composed of personnel made available by the vari-
ous divisions and branches within the squadron. The composition of a
£ light crew can vary dependent on the mission assigned, but a typical




Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4700. 2A, The Naval Aircraft
Maintenance Program (U) , 2 October 1964.
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A patrol squadron flight crew is organized as a functional unit
and is trained, both flight and ground, and operates as a cohesive,
well coordinated unit for maximum effectiveness.
The personnel complement of a patrol squadron is determined from
three basic factors: the Maintenance and Operating (MO) factor, Crew
factor, and Administrative and Support Personnel requirements. This
predetermined complement is adequate to allow the squadron to operate
at a level of maximum sustained effort.
The Maintenance and Operating Factor indicates the number of en-
listed personnel, by rating, required to maintain and operate one spe-
cific type of aircraft for a specified level of maintenance for a
specified flight hour utilization rate. This MO factor, when multiplied
by the squadron's aircraft allowance, determines one portion of the
personnel complement, by rate and number. This MO factor, although
applicable to one type of aircraft, is adjusted to allow for the varia-




The second portion of the squadron complement is determined from
the Crew factor. This factor, when multiplied times the aircraft allow-
ance, determines the number of flight crews required.
The last portion of the squadron's complement is the number of
Administrative Support personnel required* This is determined as a
function of the number of personnel, exclusive of Administrative Sup-
port personnel, assigned from the above two factors.
The numerical total of the personnel required by these three fac-
tors constitutes the complement of the squadron. In peacetime, squad-
rons operate under an allowance which can be expressed as a percentage
of the complement and provides for normal peacetime operations and
limited sustained operating ability depending on the type of squadron.
This allowance figure can be reduced by a manning level figure expressed
as a percentage of personnel on board to the allowance. This manning
level is the ultimate determination of the number of personnel assigned
to a squadron, and is directly dependent on the availability of person-
nel within the Navy.
A more detailed explanation and breakdown of the MO factor, Crew
factor, and Administrative and Support personnel, and sample calcula-
tions can be found in the current OPNAV Instruction covering personnel
planning factors.
OPNAV Instruction 05311. 3C, Personnel Planning Factors for Avia-





Two major decision areas, aircraft availability and crew training,
have been identified and determined to be affected directly by the
manhours expended within each area and the effectiveness with which
these manhours are utilized. Decisions within these areas must be such
that the maximum measure of effectiveness, Readiness Index, is achieved,
To accomplish this, the organization structure must recognize and sepa-
rate these decision areas.
At first glance, these decision areas seem to be separate and dis-
tinct. However, within the framework of the present squadron organiza-
tion the contrary is true. The organization provides for separating
the functions of the two decision areas but not the personnel by which
both, aircraft availability and crew training, are accomplished.
Aircraft availability, for purposes of the Readiness Index points,
has been defined previously as the percentage of aircraft operationally
ready in all respects. The responsibility for the material readiness
of the aircraft is delegated to the Aircraft Maintenance Officer, as
noted in chapter III. The Standard Navy Maintenance and Material Man-
agement System (3M System) Manual states in part:
The end objective of the Management system then is to
insure the highest state of aircraft readiness and reliability
at the lowest cost in men, money, and material. All other
considerations are secondary to this objective. At the same
time the Management System will insure that maintenance per-
sonnel, equipment, and facilities, are, in fact, utilized to
18

the fullest extent in the actual performance of maintenance
and are not squandered in non-maintenance functions....
A necessary corollary to the attainment of the highest state of air-
craft readiness is a comprehensive training program for the maintenance
personnel. This function of aircraft availability is also the responsi-
bility of the Aircraft Maintenance Officer.
Readiness Index points for crew training are awarded under the con-
2ditions set forth in the current Fleet Air Wings Instruction. In gen-
eral, they may be awarded to a crew only when each enlisted member of
that crew is a qualified and coded (NEC) aircrewman having completed an
individual flight crew training syllabus, that the crew has performed
as a team on a minimum number of training exercises, missions, or simu-
lator training periods, and that the crew has qualified in an airborne
exercise required by current instructions. It is evident that crew
training encompasses the requirements for both flight and ground train-
ing of the flight crew personnel, and the conduct of flight operations.
The responsibility for these functions, as noted in chapter III, has
been delegated to the Operations Officer*
As indicated above, the squadron organization recognizes the two
Readiness Index decision areas, aircraft availability and crew training,
and separates their functions. The accomplishment of these two functions
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management Manual , 9 December
1964, p. 1-3.
^Commander Fleet Air Wings, U. S. Pacific Fleet Instruction, Readi -
ness Reporting by Pacific Fleet Patrol Squadrons ; instructions concern -
ing (U), 31 December 19b4.
19

however is complicated by the fact that flight crew personnel are uti-
lized jointly by both the Maintenance and Operations Departments.
As noted previously, enlisted flight crew personnel are made avail-
able to the Operations Officer from the various divisions and branches
within the squadron* These personnel are then formed into crews, which
are scheduled and operationally trained under the cognizance of the
Operations Officer. The ratings of the personnel included in the squad-
ron's complement as aircrewmen are set forth in the current OPNAV In-
3
struction concerning personnel planning factors. The ratings presently
listed are primarily maintenance ratings. These personnel are assigned,
therefore, to the Aircraft Maintenance Department. Consequently, per-
sonnel serving as flight crew members are utilized both in attainment
of factors of crew training and aircraft availability.
The present organization introduces conflict between the decision
areas by forcing the utilization of the same personnel to achieve dif-
ferent functional goals, the responsibility for which rests with differ-
ent officers. This fundamental organizational conflict is further in-
tensified by the stated objectives of the two individual decision areas,
which requires any consideration other than stated objectives to be
secondary in nature. Under these conditions the Maintenance Officer
and the Operations Officer will strive to maximize the output of the
functions in their individual decision areas of responsibility. The
adverse effects resulting from this enforced subopt ionization becomes
particularly conspicuous when operating under a personnel constraint
3
OPNAV Instruction 05311. 3C, loc. cit,
20

imposed by a reduced manning level. Under such constraints, the squad-
ron's overall personnel level is reduced, yet the flight crew personnel
requirements remain constant, necessitating 100% manning. Since flight
crews are formed from Maintenance Department personnel, the result of
this requirement has the effect of reducing ground maintenance person-
nel by a factor larger than the original manning level figure, and the
same maintenance requirements must be fulfilled with fewer personnel.
The overall result is that flight crews must be utilized to a greater
extent in the maintenance of aircraft, to the detriment of crew training
time. Conflict between the decision areas is most evident in matters
involving flight crew scheduling and flight crew morale.
In the long run, resolution of scheduling conflicts might be
assisted by utilization of principles of economic analysis such as those
advocated by Hitch and McKean in their book, The Economics of Defense
4
in the Nuclear Age, provided appropriate criteria could be established.
In the economic analysis, flight crew manhours are considered to be
expended for increasing either factors of crew readiness or aircraft
availability. The production possibility curve resulting from expendi-
ture of a given amount of flight crew manhours assumes a familiar two-
dimensional shape, shown in figure 7.
The optimal allocation of flight crew manhours to each of the two
factors requires the use of indifference curves, which indicate con-
stant levels of squadron readiness. Data to construct such curves were
not available; however it is assumed that the curves will have a shape
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
















































The combination of these oversimplified curves is shown in figure
9, and the point of tangency of the production possibility curve with
22

the highest valued Indifference curve indicates the optimal mix of










COMBINED PRODUCTION POSSIBILITY AND INDIFFERENCE CURVES
In the short run analysis, the problem cannot be presented in a
simple two-dimensional figure because of the imposed suboptimization
and the multiplicity of constraints, both external and internal, imposed
on the day-to-day functions affecting factors of flight crew training



















5. Requirements imposed by higher authority
Unexpected changes or variations in any one or more of the above
factors can, at any time, require scheduling changes to make the most
effective use of the flight crew personnel manhours within either depart-
ment, Intradepartmental channels exist which can resolve these schedul-
ing problems to the satisfaction of the individual department. However,
resolution of the individual department's problem by schedule adjustments,
without interdepartment coordination, generates scheduling problems
within the other department.
Within the framework of the present organization, conflict is re-
duced to a workable degree by an inordinate expenditure of time spent in
coordination of the utilization of the same personnel to perform the
separate functions of the Operations and Maintenance Departments.
The impact of this conflict in scheduling and the necessity to
utilize the same personnel to perform separate departmental functions
is reflected in the attitude of flight crew personnel. A survey of pa-
trol squadrons conducted at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, by a
Naval Warfare Seminar Project Panel in 1964, indicated that 17.9% of
enlisted personnel presently serving as flight crewmen do not desire to
24

serve in this capacity. Various reasons were given for not desiring
to fly, but the most frequent was the long hours necessitated by the
requirement to both fly as a flight crewman and also to perform main-
tenance on the aircraft.
An additional organizational problem affecting flight crew atti-
tude or morale is evident when the functional chain of command of the
flight crew personnel is examined. A synthesis of that chain of com-
mand is shown in figure 10. A cursory examination of this figure
reveals the multiplicity of supervisory personnel to whom the flight
crewman is responsible in the performance of his duties.
Flight crew personnel are responsible to the Leading Chief Petty
Officer through Section Leaders for the performance of military duties
such as watch standing, drills and formations.
Flight crew personnel are responsible to the Maintenance Officer
through their respective Divisions for the proper performance of work
within their rates.
Flight crew personnel are responsible to the Operations Officer
through the flight crew Flight and Ground Training Officer for the per-
formance of training associated with crew readiness.
Flight crew personnel are responsible to the Patrol Plane Com-
mander for performance of duties associated with the conduct of all
operational or training flights. This includes pre-flight briefing,
aircraft loading, pre-flight inspection of the aircraft, flight opera-
tions and post-flight briefing.
5LCDR R. A. Koch et al, "The Effect of Personnel Factors on VP/VS
Antisubmarine Warfare Readiness," (paper read at the Naval Warfare


































The above clearly indicates the disregard for one of the basic
fundamental principles of organization, unity of command. As stated in
the book Naval Leadership, "Results from violation of this principle are
obvious: a subordinate may find it necessary to violate orders from
both superiors in order to take action; or, as an alternative, he may
6
do nothing at all."
Sialcolm E. Wolfe et al, Naval Leadership (Annapolis:, United States





Solution of the problems discussed within the decision areas in-
volves measures to obviate utilization of the same personnel to fulfill
separate functions of separate departments in the optimization of the
Readiness Index.
The most obvious organizational change which would accomplish this
seems to be the separation of the personnel required to accomplish both
flight crew and aircraft maintenance functions. This separation could
be accomplished by the formation of a Flight Crew Division within the
Operations Department as shown in figure 11.
The Flight Crew Officer under the Operations Officer would be re-
sponsible for all aspects of flight crew readiness. This minor change
does not require any major revisions of current responsibilities for
flight crew readiness in that the Operations Officer is presently re-
sponsible for these functions. Personnel required to fulfill the func-
tions would be assigned directly to the Flight Crew Division and be
responsible to the Flight Crew Division Officer for overall performance
and to the Patrol Plane Commander for airborne performance. Flight
crew personnel should not be required to perform routine military watch-
standing duties scheduled by the Leading Chief Petty Officer, but
should be required to stand only ready, alert, standby and other duties
1
NWIP 41-1, ASW Patrol Aircraft (U), Department of the Navy,
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which provide flight crew training and directly involve operational
readiness or operational flights. Any expenditure of flight crew man-
hours in pursuit of goals other than the development of a cohesive,
well coordinated operational flight team is to the detriment of opera-
tional readiness. The scheduling of flight crews in performance of
ready, alert, standby, and other duties would be the function of the
Flight Crew Division Officer.
The net result of the assignment of responsibilities, functions,
and personnel in this manner would eliminate two of the four seniors in
the flight crew members' functional chain of command shown in chapter
IV, figure 10. Further reduction is not plausible in view of the na-
ture of the activities of the flight crews. When flying, "the Patrol
Plane Commander, regardless of rank, is an officer assigned and so
designated by his Commanding Officer as possessing full responsibility
for the successful completion of a mission and the safety of aircraft
2
and crew." When not involved in flight operations, however, greater
efficiency can be achieved by centralization of control of the flight
crew functions under the Flight Crew Division Officer.
The above centralization of authority and responsibility for the
functions of the flight crews also serves to bring about conformity
with the principle of unity of command. The flight crew personnel would
now be responsible to only the Operations Officer when not actually fly-
ing. This allows the maximum amount of departmental flexibility in the
utilization of flight crew manhours for flight crew training and
"NWIP 41~1 8 o£. cit. , p. 4-3,
30

development of the maximum possible crew readiness.
Recognizing the fact that most flight crew member functions do not
require extensive maintenance capabilities, the present assignment of
maintenance rates to flight crews appears to be an extravagant waste of
maintenance trained personnel.
As shown by the typical flight crew listed in chapter III, the
functions of the enlisted flight crew, with the exception of the plane
captain, are primarily equipment operation for search, detection, clas-
sification, localization and attack. Present weapon system reliability
and sophistication does not require and, in many cases, defies inflight
repair due to the extensive test equipment required to perform repairs.
It would appear that extensive and expensive training, especially in
the electronics field, of personnel prior to assignment to flight crew
status is unnecessary, and uneconomic. The establishment of a flight
crew rate with limited training as weapons systems operators seems more
appropriate to fulfill the flight crew functions. This rate should
include the requirements that all personnel be volunteers and physically
qualified for duty involving flying as flight crew members.
The flight crew rating need not be established as a career rating.
Indeed, the interests of the Navy and the personnel involved seem to be
served best by limiting the duration in this capacity. Personnel could
be recruited directly as flight crew candidates, trained in a minimum
amount of time, and distributed to the Fleet squadrons for maximum real-
ization of flight crew potential. Issuance of permanent orders to duty
involving flying similar to those of Naval Aviators and Naval Aviation




Service as flight crew members could be limited to personnel in
their first tour of sea duty, except in special cases, such as flight
test and instructor crews. All career-motivated flight crew personnel
would be ordered to training schools ashore following completion of the
first sea duty tour for training and conversion to maintenance ratings.
Especially well-qualified personnel completing the training could be
returned to fulfill special case requirements mentioned above. Career
patterns after completion of maintenance training would be normal for
the ratings selected. These personnel would be utilized in performance
of maintenance functions only.
There are several advantages of the above system. Highly motivated,
volunteer personnel would be utilized as flight crew members. Expendi-
ture of funds for maintenance training would be reduced. Costs of the
hazardous duty pay program would be reduced by the elimination of paper
work. Operator efficiency would be increased as a result of the func-
tional approach to the flight crew candidate training program.
Separation of the functions of flight crew and maintenance person-
nel is recognized as evidenced by the separate categories set forth in
3
the personnel planning factors. However, application of manning level
constraints must recognize adequately the interaction which exists be-
tween flight crew and maintenance functions. Instead of applying to
the squadron personnel as a whole, the manning level constraint should
be applied to the functional areas separately to provide for optimum
3OPNA¥ Instruction 05311. 3C. Personnel Planning Factors for Avia-
tion Activities (U) , 1965.
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utilization of personnel and primary mission equipment.
Separation of flight crew and maintenance personnel functions would
require that manning level constraints be applied in three separate
areas: aircraft allocation/availability, flight crew allocation, and
maintenance personnel allocation* The identical manning level figure
or constraint need not be utilized for both flight crew and maintenance
personnel although this situation is the most desirable and efficient.
The manning level constraint for each area would be determined by the
availability of personnel for assignment in the flight crew rate and
maintenance rates. Both of the constraints, however, must be considered
in establishing a constraint within the aircraft allocation/availability
area.
Three possible situations could exist within a squadron under the
proposed application of manning level constraints: constraints applied
to flight crew personnel only, with 100% manning of maintenance rates,
constraints applied to maintenance personnel only, with 100% manning of
flight crew rate, and constraints applied to both maintenance and flight
crew personnel.
In the first case, where constraints are applied to flight crew
personnel only, the Imposed reduction in flight crew personnel must be
accompanied by a proportionate reduction in aircraft allocated or assigned
to the squadron. Although maintenance personnel will be available to
maintain a full allowance of aircraft, flight crews will not be avail-
able to man a full allowance of aircraft.
The second case above, where constraints are applied to maintenance
personnel only, the imposed reduction of maintenance personnel must be
33

accompanied by a reduction of aircraft utilization proportionate to the
manning level constraint. Flight crews will be available for all air-
craft but maintenance personnel will not be able to maintain the air-
craft at the previously assigned utilization level.
The third situation, where constraints are applied to both flight
crew personnel and maintenance personnel, requires a proportionate re-
duction in the number of aircraft assigned, and a reduction of required
utilization if necessary. This last situation provides the most desir-
able situation for efficient personnel utilization when forced to
-a
operate under manning level constraints.
Application of the manning level constraints in these separate
areas accomplishes two separate purposes. First, any trend toward a
large imbalance between flight crew and maintenance personnel, as in
situations one and two above, although beyond squadron control, would
alert higher authority of the necessity to initiate corrective action
by changes in recruiting and selection criteria to achieve a more
effective personnel balance. Second, and most important, this applica-
tion requires a reduction in aircraft assigned and/or aircraft utiliza-
tion when personnel are reduced. This allows the squadron to obtain
normal effective manhour utilization of the personnel available and at
the same time recognizes the actual reduction in total squadron capa-
bility.
Recommendations to resolve the organizationally induced conflict
associated with the allocation and utilization of flight crew personnel,
briefly, include the following:
34

1) Establishment of a Flight Crew Division within the Operations
Department.
2) Establishment of a flight crew rating.
3) Appropriate application of manning level constraints and fac-
tors.
Adoption of these recommendations could result in improved operational






The recommendations set forth In the previous chapter were formu-
lated to reduce organizationally induced conflict within individual
squadrons. This conflict could, no doubt, be reduced by other methods;
however, the solution presented allows, to a greater degree than pre-
sently allowed, the required suboptimization of department heads within
individual squadrons. Suboptimization in itself is not bad, in fact
-a
"suboptimizations are both necessary and inevitable and provide scope
for productive quantitative analysis of important problems of choice."
The recommendations allow each department a more compact decision
area of how to utilize its own manhours instead of the multiple decision
area of how departments are to utilize available manhours jointly. This
streamlining of the decision areas seems a necessity within operational
units, for it allows more time for actual performance of the required
functions and requires less expenditure of time in interdepartmental
coordination.
The problem of personnel allocation would no longer be a problem
within the squadron as maintenance and flight crew personnel would auto-
matically be allocated by rate as well as functions. This problem of
personnel allocation would not disappear, however; it would be elevated
to a higher echelon and dealt with as a staff function in relation to
all patrol squadrons.
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 129,
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The functional application of the manning level constraint figure
by higher authority will also allow preparation of selected squadrons
for deployments. Squadrons could be readied for deployed duty in ad-
vance by adjusting the individual squadron's manning levels in mainten-
ance and flight crew personnel. If necessary, this could be accomplished
at the expense of squadrons not scheduled for deployment in the near
future. In other words, manning level constraints could be varied be-
tween squadrons for the most effective use of the individual squadrons,
as determined by higher authority.
Application of the manning level figure to the aircraft allocation/
utilization will also reflect the true capability of a squadron. Under
present conditions all squadrons are expected to maintain the standard
allowance of aircraft and meet standard utilization requirements regard-
less of manning level. In most cases this is accomplished, but utiliza-
tion, per se, does not indicate that optimum operational readiness was
achieved and the accomplishment should not cloud the obvious fact that
a squadron operating under manning level constraints does not have the
capability of a fully manned unit. Application of the manning level
figure in this area will immediately indicate, by aircraft allowance re-
duction, or reduced aircraft utilization requirement, the actual capacity
of the squadron.
Planning and programing of ASW commitments by higher authority are
based on the existing and expected future capabilities of operating units.
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that these authorities immedi-
ately realize any reduction of capability. Although the solution recom-
mended by this paper is designed to help reduce organizational conflict
within the individual squadron , it also generates information which could
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